It is not uncommon for universal quantification to be described as
(potentially) infinite conjunction^{1}.
Quoting Wikipedia’s Quantifier_(logic)
page (my emphasis):

For a finite domain of discourse |D = \{a_1,\dots,a_n\}|, the universal quantifier is equivalent to a logical conjunction of propositions with singular terms |a_i| (having the form |Pa_i| for monadic predicates).

The existential quantifier is equivalent to a logical disjunction of propositions having the same structure as before.

For infinite domains of discourse, the equivalences are similar.

While there’s a small grain of truth to this, I think it is wrong and/or misleading far more often than it’s useful or correct. Indeed, it takes a bit of effort to even get a statement that makes sense at all. There’s a bit of conflation between syntax and semantics that’s required to have it naively make sense, unless you’re working (quite unusually) in an infinitary logic where it is typically outright false.

What harm does this confusion do? The most obvious harm is that this view does not generalize to non-classical logics. I’ll focus on constructive logics, in particular. Besides causing problems in these contexts, which maybe you think you don’t care about, it betrays a significant gap in understanding of what universal quantification actually is. Even in purely classical contexts, this confusion often manifests, e.g., in confusion about |\omega|-inconsistency.

So what is the difference between universal quantification and
infinite conjunction? Well, the most obvious difference is that
infinite conjunction is indexed by some (meta-theoretic) set that
doesn’t have anything to do with the domain the universal quantifier
quantifies over. However, even if these sets happened to coincide^{2} there are
still differences between universal quantification and infinite
conjunction. The key is that universal quantification
requires the predicate being quantified over to hold *uniformly*,
while infinite conjunction does not. It just so happens that for
the standard set-theoretic semantics of classical first-order logic
this “uniformity” constraint is degenerate. However, even for
classical first-order logic, this notion of uniformity will be
relevant.

I want to start in the context where this identification is closest to being true, so I can show where the idea comes from. The summary of this section is that the standard, classical, set-theoretic semantics of universal quantification is equivalent to an infinitary generalization of the semantics of conjunction. The issue is “infinitary generalization of the semantics of conjunction” isn’t the same as “semantics of infinitary conjunction”.

The standard set-theoretic semantics of classical first-order logic interprets each formula, |\varphi|, as a subset of |D^{\mathsf{fv}(\varphi)}| where |D| is a given domain set and |\mathsf{fv}| computes the (necessarily finite) set of free variables of |\varphi|. Traditionally, |D^{\mathsf{fv}(\varphi)}| would be identified with |D^n| where |n| is the cardinality of |\mathsf{fv}(\varphi)|. This involves an arbitrary mapping of the free variables of |\varphi| to the numbers |1| to |n|. The semantics of a formula then becomes an |n|-ary set-theoretic relation.

The interpretation of binary conjunction is straightforward:

\[\den{\varphi \land \psi} = \den{\varphi} \cap \den{\psi}\]

where |\den{\varphi}| stands for the interpretation of the formula |\varphi|. To be even more explicit, I should index this notation by a structure which specifies the domain, |D|, as well as the interpretations of any predicate or function symbols, but we’ll just consider this fixed but unspecified.

The interpretation of universal quantification is more complicated but still fairly straightforward:

\[\den{\forall x.\varphi} = \bigcap_{d \in D}\left\{\bar y|_{\mathsf{fv}(\varphi) \setminus \{x\}} \mid \bar y \in \den{\varphi} \land \bar y(x) = d\right\}\]

Set-theoretically, we have:

\[\begin{align} \bar z \in \bigcap_{d \in D}\left\{\bar y|_{\mathsf{fv}(\varphi) \setminus \{x\}} \mid \bar y \in \den{\varphi} \land \bar y(x) = d\right\} \iff & \forall d \in D. \bar z \in \left\{\bar y|_{\mathsf{fv}(\varphi) \setminus \{x\}} \mid \bar y \in \den{\varphi} \land \bar y(x) = d\right\} \\ \iff & \forall d \in D. \exists \bar y \in \den{\varphi}. \bar z = \bar y|_{\mathsf{fv}(\varphi) \setminus \{x\}} \land \bar y(x) = d \\ \iff & \forall d \in D. \bar z[x \mapsto d] \in \den{\varphi} \end{align}\]

where |f[x \mapsto c]| extends a function |f \in D^{S}| to a function in |D^{S \cup \{x\}}|
via |f[x \mapsto c](v) = \begin{cases}c, &\textrm{ if }v = x \\ f(v), &\textrm{ if }v \neq x\end{cases}|.
The final |\iff| arises because |\bar z[x \mapsto d]| is the *unique* function which
extends |\bar z| to the desired domain such that |x| is mapped to |d|. Altogether, this
illustrates our desired semantics of the interpretation of |\forall x.\varphi| being the
interpretations of |\varphi| which hold when |x| is interpreted as any element of the domain.

This demonstrates the summary that the semantics of quantification is an infinitary version of the semantics of conjunction, as |\bigcap| is an infinitary version of |\cap|. But even here there are substantial cracks in this perspective.

The first problem is that we don’t have an infinitary conjunction so saying universal quantification is essentially infinitary conjunction doesn’t make sense. However, it’s easy enough to formulate the syntax and semantics of infinitary conjunction (assuming we have a meta-theoretic notion of sets).

Syntactically, for a (meta-theoretic) set |I| and an |I|-indexed family of formulas |\{\varphi_i\}_{i \in I}|, we have the infinitary conjunction |\bigwedge_{i \in I} \varphi_i|.

The set-theoretic semantics of this connective *is* a direct generalization of the
binary conjunction case:

\[\bigden{\bigwedge_{i \in I}\varphi_i} = \bigcap_{i \in I}\den{\varphi_i}\]

If |I = \{1,2\}|, we recover exactly the binary conjunction case.

Equipped with a semantics of *actual* infinite conjunction, we can compare
to the semantics of universal quantification case and see where things go wrong.

The first problem is that it makes no sense to choose |I| to be |D|. The formula
|\bigwedge_{i \in I} \varphi_i| can be interpreted with respect to many
different domains. So any particular choice of |D| would be wrong for most semantics.
This is assuming that our syntax’s meta-theoretic sets were the same as our
semantics’ meta-theoretic sets, which need not be the case at all^{3}.

An even bigger problem is that infinitary conjunction expects a family of formulas while with universal quantification has just one. This is one facet of the uniformity I mentioned. Universal quantification has one formula that is interpreted a single way (with respect to the given structure). The infinitary intersection expression is computing a set out of this singular interpretation. Infinitary conjunction, on the other hand, has a family of formulas which need have no relation to each other. Each of these formulas is independently interpreted and then all those separate interpretations are combined with an infinitary intersection. The problem we have is that there’s generally no way to take a formula |\varphi| with free variable |x| and an element |d \in D| and make a formula |\varphi_d| with |x| not free such that |\bar y[x \mapsto d] \in \den{\varphi} \iff \bar y \in \den{\varphi_d}|. A simple cardinality argument shows that: there are only countably many (finitary) formulas, but there are plenty of uncountable domains. This is why |\omega|-inconsistency is possible. We can easily have elements in the domain which cannot be captured by any formula.

Instead of taking a semantic view, let’s take a syntactic view of universal quantification and infinitary conjunction, i.e. let’s compare the rules that characterize them. As before, the first problem we have is that traditional first-order logic does not have infinitary conjunction, but we can easily formulate what the rules would be.

The elimination rules are superficially similar but have subtle but important distinctions:

\[\frac{\Gamma \vdash \forall x.\varphi}{\Gamma \vdash \varphi[x \mapsto t]}\forall E,t
\qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \bigwedge_{i \in I} \varphi_i}{\Gamma \vdash \varphi_j}{\wedge}E,j\]
where |t| is a term, |j| is an element of |I|, and |\varphi[x \mapsto t]| corresponds
to syntactically substituting |t| for |x| in |\varphi| in a capture-avoiding way. A first,
not-so-subtle distinction is if |I| is an infinite set, then |\bigwedge_{i \in I}\varphi_i|
is an infinitely large formula. Another pretty obvious issue is universal quantification is
restricted to instantiating terms while |I| stands for either an *arbitrary* (meta-theoretic)
set or it may stand for some particular (meta-theoretic) set, e.g. |\mathbb N|. Either
way, it is typically not the set of terms of the logic.

Arguably, this isn’t an issue since the claim isn’t that every infinite conjunction corresponds to a universal quantification, but only that universal quantification corresponds to some infinite conjunction. The set of terms is a possible choice for |I|, so that shouldn’t be a problem. Well, whether it’s a problem or not depends on how you set up the syntax of the language. In my preferred way of handling the syntax of logical formulas, I index each formula by the set of free variables that may occur in that formula. This means the set of terms varies with the set of possible free variables. Writing |\vdash_V \varphi| to mean |\varphi| is well-formed and provable in a context with free variables |V|, then we would want the following rule:

\[\frac{\vdash_V \varphi}{\vdash_U \varphi}\] where |V \subseteq U|. This
simply states that if a formula is provable, it should remain provable even if we
add more (unused) free variables. This causes a problem with having an infinitary
conjunction indexed by terms. Writing |\mathsf{Term}(V)| for the set of terms
with (potential) free variables in |V|, then while |\vdash_V \bigwedge_{t \in \mathsf{Term}(V)}\varphi_t|
might be okay, this would also lead to |\vdash_U \bigwedge_{t \in \mathsf{Term}(V)}\varphi_t| which
would also hold but would no longer correspond to universal quantification in
a context with free variables in |U|. This really makes a difference. For example,
for many theories, such as the usual presentation of **ZFC**, |\mathsf{Term}(\varnothing) = \varnothing|,
i.e. there are no closed terms. As such, |\vdash_\varnothing \forall x.\bot|
is neither provable (which we wouldn’t expect it to be) *nor refutable* without additional axioms. On the
other hand, |\bigwedge_{i \in \varnothing}\bot| is |\top| and thus trivially
provable. If we consider |\vdash_{\{y\}} \forall x.\bot| next, it becomes
refutable. This doesn’t contradict our earlier rule about adding free variables
because |\vdash_\varnothing \forall x.\bot| wasn’t provable and so the rule
says nothing. On the other hand, that rule does require |\vdash_{\{y\}} \bigwedge_{i \in \varnothing}\bot|
to be provable, and it is. Of course, it no longer corresponds to |\forall x.\bot|
with this set of free variables. The putative corresponding formula would be
|\bigwedge_{i \in \{y\}}\bot| which is indeed refutable.

With the setup above, we can’t get the elimination rule for |\bigwedge| to correspond to the elimination rule for |\forall|, because there isn’t a singular set of terms. However, a more common if less clean approach is to allow all free variables all the time, i.e. to fix a single countably infinite set of variables once and for all. This would “resolve” this problem.

The differences in the introduction rules are more stark. The rules are:

\[\frac{\Gamma \vdash \varphi \quad x\textrm{ not free in }\Gamma}{\Gamma \vdash \forall x.\varphi}\forall I \qquad \frac{\left\{\Gamma \vdash \varphi_i \right\}_{i \in I}}{\Gamma \vdash \bigwedge_{i \in I}\varphi_i}{\wedge}I\]

Again, the most blatant difference is that (when |I| is infinite) |{\wedge}I| corresponds to an infinitely large derivation. Again, the uniformity aspects show through. |\forall I| requires a single derivation that will handle all terms, whereas |{\wedge}I| allows a different derivation for each |i \in I|.

We don’t run into the same issue as in the semantic view with needing to turn
elements of the domain into terms/formulas. Given a formula |\varphi| with
free variable |x|, we can easily make a formula |\varphi_t| for every
term |t|, namely |\varphi_t = \varphi[x \mapsto t]|. We won’t have the
issue that leads to |\omega|-inconsistency because |\forall x.\varphi|
is derivable from |\bigwedge_{t \in \mathsf{Term}(V)}\varphi[x \mapsto t]|.
Of course, the reason this is true is because one of the terms in |\mathsf{Term}(V)|
will be a variable not occurring in |\Gamma| allowing us to derive the
premise of |\forall I|. On the other hand, if we choose |I = \mathsf{Term}(\varnothing)|,
i.e. only consider closed terms, which is what the |\omega| rule in arithmetic
is doing, then we definitely can get |\omega|-inconsistency-like situations.
Most notably, in the case of theories, like **ZFC**, which have *no* closed
terms.

A constructive perspective allows us to accentuate the contrast between universal quantification and infinitary conjunction even more as well as bring more clarity to the notion of uniformity.

We’ll start with the BHK interpretation of Intuitionistic logic and specifically a realizabilty interpretation. For this, we’ll allow infinitary conjunction only for |I = \mathbb N|.

I’ll write |n\textbf{ realizes }\varphi| for the statement that the natural number |n| realizes the formula |\varphi|. As in the linked articles, we’ll need a computable pairing function which computably encodes a pair of natural numbers as a natural number. I’ll just write this using normal pairing notation, i.e. |(n,m)|. We’ll also need Gödel numbering to computably map a natural number |n| to a computable function |f_n|.

\[\begin{align} (n_0, n_1)\textbf{ realizes }\varphi_1 \land \varphi_2 \quad & \textrm{if and only if} \quad n_0\textbf{ realizes }\varphi_0\textrm{ and } n_1\textbf{ realizes }\varphi_1 \\ n\textbf{ realizes }\forall x.\varphi \quad & \textrm{if and only if}\quad \textrm{for all }m, f_n(m)\textbf{ realizes }\varphi[x \mapsto m] \\ (k, n_k)\textbf{ realizes }\varphi_1 \lor \varphi_2 \quad & \textrm{if and only if} \quad k \in \{0, 1\}\textrm{ and }n_k\textbf{ realizes }\varphi_k \\ n\textbf{ realizes }\neg\varphi \quad & \textrm{if and only if} \quad\textrm{there is no }m\textrm{ such that }m\textbf{ realizes }\varphi \end{align}\]

I included disjunction and negation in the above so I could talk about the Law of the Excluded Middle. Via the above interpretation, given any formula |\varphi| with free variable |x|, the meaning of |\forall x.\varphi\lor\neg\varphi| would be a computable function which for each natural number |m| produces a bit indicating whether or not |\varphi[x \mapsto m]| holds. The Law of Excluded Middle holding would thus mean every such formula is computationally decidable which we know isn’t the case. For example, choose |\varphi| as the formula which asserts that the |x|-th Turing machine halts.

This example illustrates the uniformity constraint. Assuming a traditional, classical
meta-language, e.g. **ZFC**, then it is the case that |(\varphi\lor\neg\varphi)[x \mapsto m]| is
realized for each |m| in the case where |\varphi| is asserting the halting of the |x|-th
Turing machine^{4}. But this interpretation of universal quantification
requires not only that the quantified formula holds for all naturals, but also that
we can computably find this out.

It’s clear that trying to formulate a notion of infinitary conjunction with regards
to realizability would require using something other than natural numbers as realizers
if we just directly generalize the finite conjunction case. For example, we might
use potentially infinite sequences of natural numbers as realizers. Regardless,
the discussion of the previous example makes it clear an interpretation of infinitary
conjunction can’t be done in standard computability^{5},
while, obviously, universal quantification can.

The categorical semantics of universal quantification and conjunction are quite different which also suggests that they are not related, at least not in some straightforward way.

One way to get to categorical semantics is to restate traditional, set-theoretic semantics in categorical terms. Traditionally, the semantics of a formula is a subset of some product of the domain set, one for each free variable. Categorically, that suggests we want finite products and the categorical semantics of a formula should be a subobject of a product of some object representing the domain.

Conjunction is traditionally represented via intersection of subsets, and categorically
we form the intersection of subobjects via pulling back. So to support finite conjunctions,
we need our category to additionally have finite pullbacks of monomorphisms. Infinitary
conjunctions simply require infinitely wide pullbacks of monomorphisms. However, we
can start to see some cracks here. What does it mean for a pullback to be infinitely wide?
It means the obvious thing; namely, that we have an infinite set of monomorphisms sharing
a codomain, and we’ll take the limit of this diagram. The key here, though, is “*set*”.
Regardless of whatever the objects of our semantic category are, the infinitary conjunctions
are indexed by a set.

To talk about the categorical semantics of universal quantification, we need to bring to
the foreground some structure that we have been leaving – and traditionally accounts do leave
– in the background. Before, I said the semantics of a formula, |\varphi|, depends on the
free variables in that formula, e.g. if |D| is our domain object, then the semantics of
a formula with three free variables would be a subobject of |\prod_{v \in \mathsf{fv}(\varphi)}D \cong D\times D \times D|
which I’ll continue to write as |D^{\mathsf{fv}(\varphi)}| though now it will be
interpreted as a product rather than a function space. For |\mathbf{Set}|,
this makes no difference.
It would be more accurate to say that a formula can be given semantics in any product
of the domain object indexed by any *superset* of the free variables. This is just
to say that a formula doesn’t need to use every free variable that is available. Nevertheless,
even if it is induced by the same formula, a subobject of |D^{\mathsf{fv}(\varphi)}| is
a different subobject than a subobject of |D^{\mathsf{fv}(\varphi) \cup \{u\}}|
where |u| is a variable not free in |\varphi|, so we need a way of relating the semantics
of formulas considered with respect to different sets of free variables.

To do this, we will formulate a category of contexts and index our semantics by it.
Fix a category |\mathcal C| and an object |D| of |\mathcal C|. Our category
of contexts, |\mathsf{Ctx}|, will be the full subcategory of |\mathcal C| with
objects of the form |D^S| where |S| is a finite subset of |V|, a fixed set of
variables. We’ll assume these products exist, though typically we’ll just assume
that |\mathcal C| has *all* finite products. From here, we use the |\mathsf{Sub}| functor.
|\mathsf{Sub} : \mathsf{Ctx}^{op} \to \mathbf{Pos}| maps an object
of |\mathsf{Ctx}| to the poset of its subobjects as objects of |\mathcal C|^{6}.
Now an arrow |f : D^{\{x,y,z,w\}} \to D^{\{x,y,z\}}| would induce a monotonic function
|\mathsf{Sub}(f) : \mathsf{Sub}(D^{\{x,y,z\}}) \to \mathsf{Sub}(D^{\{x,y,z,w\}})|.
This is defined for each subobject by pulling back a representative monomorphism of that subobject along |f|.
Arrows of |\mathsf{Ctx}| are the semantic analogues of substitutions, and |\mathsf{Sub}(f)|
applies these “substitutions” to the semantics of formulas.

Universal quantification is then characterized as the (indexed) right adjoint (Galois connection in this context) of |\mathsf{Sub}(\pi^x)| where |\pi^x : D^S \to D^{S \setminus \{x\}}| is just projection. The indexed nature of this adjoint leads to Beck-Chevalley conditions reflecting the fact universal quantification should respect substitution. |\mathsf{Sub}(\pi^x)| corresponds to adding |x| as a new, unused free variable to a formula. Let |U| be a subobject of |D^{S \setminus \{x\}}| and |V| a subobject of |D^S|. Furthermore, write |U \sqsubseteq U’| to indicate that |U| is a subobject of the subobject |U’|, i.e. that the monos that represent |U| factor through the monos that represent |U’|. The adjunction then states: \[\mathsf{Sub}(\pi^x)(U) \sqsubseteq V\quad \textrm{if and only if}\quad U \sqsubseteq \forall_x(V)\] The |\implies| direction is a fairly direct semantic analogue of the |\forall I| rule: \[\frac{\Gamma \vdash \varphi\quad x\textrm{ not free in }\Gamma}{\Gamma \vdash \forall x.\varphi}\] Indeed, it is easy to show that the converse of this rule is derivable with |\forall E| validating the semantic “if and only if”. To be clear, the full adjunction is natural in |U| and |V| and indexed, effectively, in |S|.

Incidentally, we’d also want the semantics of infinite conjunctions to respect substitution, so they too have a Beck-Chevalley condition they satisfy and give rise to an indexed right adjoint.

It’s hard to even compare the categorical semantics of infinitary conjunction and universal
quantification, let alone conflate them, *even when |\mathcal C = \mathbf{Set}|*. This isn’t
too surprising as these semantics work just fine for constructive logics where, as illustrated
earlier, these can be semantically distinct. As mentioned, both of these constructs can be
described by indexed right adjoints. However, they are adjoints between very different indexed
categories. If |\mathcal M| is our indexed category (above it was |\mathsf{Sub}|), then we’ll
have |I|-indexed products if |\Delta_{\mathcal M} : \mathcal M \to [DI, -] \circ \mathcal M|
has an indexed right adjoint where |D : \mathbf{Set} \to \mathbf{cat}| is the discrete (small)
category functor. For |\mathcal M| to have universal quantification, we need an indexed right
adjoint to an indexed functor |\mathcal M \circ \mathsf{cod} \circ \iota \to \mathcal M \circ \mathsf{dom} \circ \iota|
where |\iota : s(\mathsf{Ctx}) \hookrightarrow \mathsf{Ctx}^{\to}| is the full subcategory
of the arrow category |\mathsf{Ctx}^{\to}| consisting of just the projections.

My hope is that the preceding makes it abundantly clear that viewing universal quantification as some kind of special “infinite conjunction” is not sensible even approximately. To do so is to seriously misunderstand universal quantification. Most discussions “equating” them involve significant conflations of syntax and semantics where a specific choice of domain is fixed and elements of that specific domain are used as terms.

A secondary goal was to illustrate an aspect of logic from a variety of perspectives and illustrate some of the concerns in meta-logical reasoning. For example, quantifiers and connectives are syntactical concepts and thus can’t depend on the details of the semantic domain. As another example, better perspectives on quantifiers and connectives are more robust to weakening the logic. I’d say this is especially true when going from classical to constructive logic. Structural proof theory and categorical semantics are good at formulating logical concepts modularly so that they still make sense in very weak logics.

Unfortunately, the traditional trend towards minimalism strongly pushes in the
other direction leading to the exploiting of every symmetry and coincidence a
stronger logic (namely classical logic) provides producing definitions that
don’t survive even mild weakening of the logic^{7}. The attempt to identify
universal quantification with infinite conjunction here takes that impulse too
far and doesn’t even work in classical logic as demonstrated. While there’s
certainly value in recognizing redundancy, I personally find minimizing logical
assumptions far more important and valuable than minimizing (primitive) logical
connectives.

“Universal statements are true if they are true for every individual in the world. They can be thought of as an infinite conjunction,” from some random AI lecture notes. You can find many others.↩︎

The domain doesn’t even need to be a set.↩︎

For example, we may formulate our syntax in a second-order arithmetic identifying our syntax’s meta-theoretic sets with unary predicates, while our semantics is in

**ZFC**. Just from cardinality concerns, we know that there’s no way of injectively mapping every**ZFC**set to a set of natural numbers.↩︎It’s probably worth pointing out that not only will this classical meta-language not tell us whether it’s |\varphi[x \mapsto m]| or |\neg\varphi[x \mapsto m]| that holds for every specific |m|, but it’s easy to show (assuming consistency of

**ZFC**) that |\varphi[x \mapsto m]| is independent of**ZFC**for specific values of |m|. For example, it’s easy to make a Turing machine that halts if and only if it finds a contradiction in the theory of**ZFC**.↩︎Interestingly, for some models of computation, e.g. ones based on Turing machines, infinitary disjunction, or, specifically, |\mathbb N|-ary disjunction is

*not*problematic. Given an infinite sequence of halting Turing machines, we can interleave their execution such that every Turing machine in the sequence will halt at some finite time. Accordingly, extending the definition of disjunction in realizability to the |\mathbb N|-ary case does not run into any of the issues that |\mathbb N|-ary conjunction has and is completely unproblematic. We just let |k| be an arbitrary natural instead of just |\{0, 1\}|.↩︎This is a place we could generalize the categorical semantics further. There’s no reason we need to consider this particular functor. We could consider other functors from |\mathsf{Ctx}^{op} \to \mathbf{Pos}|, i.e. other indexed |(0,1)|-categories. This setup is called a hyperdoctrine↩︎

The most obvious example of this is defining quantifiers and connectives in terms of other connectives particularly when negation is involved. A less obvious example is the overwhelming focus on |\mathbf 2|-valued semantics when classical logic naturally allows arbitrary Boolean-algebra-valued semantics.↩︎